A Few Thoughts Concerning the Idea of Schools of Jurisprudence
Although there have been more than five madhhabs, or schools of jurisprudence, which have arisen over the last 1300 years, or so, five such schools are generally recognized today as constituting the major, mainstream approaches to issues of so-called Islamic law. These are the Hanifa, Maliki, Shafi‘i, Hanbali, and Jafari madhhabs.
The four surviving schools of Sunni jurisprudence were established during the early Abbasid era [the Abbasids had challenged the Umayyad rule on the basis that the latter was not Islamic enough in its form of governance]. The Umayyads came to power after the rule of the four righteous caliphs came to an end with the assassination of Hazrat ‘Ali [may Allah be pleased with him] around 40 A.H. [660 A.D.]
There is an essential, potential difference between the idea of Sacred Law in Islam and schools of jurisprudence which purport to give expression to the former. Oddly enough, this realm of difference revolves around the fact that Sacred Law does not necessarily have anything to do with theories of jurisprudence.
Generally speaking, jurisprudence is defined as a collection of rules that is imposed on a community or nation by someone who, legitimately or illegitimately, claims to have authority to impose such laws upon others. The collection of rules being alluded to here concerns the manner in which the public space or commons of a community or nation is to be regulated with respect to what people will and will not be permitted to do with, or in, that public space, as well as in relation to what rights and principles of justice the people of a given community are to be entitled, along with a specification of whatever duties and obligations are believed to accrue to different individuals under various circumstances.
Sacred Law – in the sense of that to which Divine revelation [such as the Qur’an] gives expression and in the sense of the operating principles through which Creation is manifested – is a function of the reality or truth of being and Being. To say that such and such aspect of life is a facet of Sacred Law is to make a claim concerning the order, nature, and purpose of that aspect of life in terms of the manner to which it allegedly gives expression to truth and the reality of things as ordained by God. Sacred Law is a function of the manner in which God has arranged Creation, including whatever degrees of freedom are inherent in the structural properties and principles of Creation, as well as in terms of the purposes for which Creation has been so arranged by Divinity.
As such, Sacred Law is not necessarily a legal system per se. For example, the physical principles that govern the manner in which the physical/material dimensions of Creation operate are not legal rules in the sense of statutory provisions that have been established for purposes of judging the conduct of the physical world and whether, or not, that conduct conforms to, or deviates from, the established statutory provisions in question.
Physical principles give expression to the reality or truth of their nature by manifesting God’s truth concerning their modes of being. By acting in accordance with their essential nature – that is, the properties and qualities which constitute the reality of that which God has ordained them to be -- physical principles are manifestations of Sacred Law. Sacred Law is simply the way things operate in relation to that facet of created existence or being.
The law of gravity does not refer to a legal set of rules. When one fails to exercise due diligence in relation to such a law, one has not violated a legal rule, but, rather, one has failed to take into consideration the way reality operates within certain circumstances, and, as a result, one must suffer whatever consequences ensue from such a failure.
The reality of gravity is an expression of Sacred Law. Every aspect of Creation is a manifestation of Sacred Law.
Human beings are also governed by Sacred Law. Such Sacred Law concerns the potentials, capacities, faculties, qualities, and possibilities which are inherent in the human form – a form which ranges from: physical, mental, and emotional properties, to: spiritual qualities.
Once again, as was the case with gravity, such Sacred Law is not necessarily a matter of determining what statutory injunctions apply to human potential and behavior. Moreover, as was the case with gravity, such Sacred law becomes a matter of trying to understand the reality or truth with respect to the manner in which some given dimension of existence operates – in this case, human beings.
To whatever extent a given school of jurisprudence does not reflect the totality of the Sacred Law concerning the nature of how a given aspect of existence gives expression to the Sacred Law, then, to that extent such an approach to jurisprudence tends to introduce errors and problems into a person’s understanding of Sacred Law. Therefore, one issue which arises when attempting to ascertain the relationship, if any, between a given school of jurisprudence and the Sacred Law becomes a matter of seeking to establish or adjudge the degree of accuracy contained in a given perspective of jurisprudence with respect to the capacity of the latter to be able to reflect the truth of the reality of some dimension or dimensions of Sacred Law in relation to human beings.
Schools of jurisprudence give expression to a set of methodologies which proponents contend will permit an individual to ascertain the nature of Sacred Law in any given set of circumstances involving human beings. Such schools of jurisprudence use the aforementioned methodologies to construct hypotheses which are said to be able to capture the governing principles of Sacred Law which an advocate of the school believes are at work in a given set of circumstances and, thereby, permit an individual to come to understand how to engage those circumstances in a manner which is consonant with Sacred Law.
In order to be able to generate a context for beginning to explore the relationship, if any, between the idea of a school of jurisprudence and the Sacred Law of God, it may be of value to briefly take a look at some of the ideas entailed by some of the different madhhabs or schools of jurisprudence. This discussion is not intended to be exhaustive but, rather, is merely intended to provide some food for thought before proceeding on in other ways.
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Abu Hanifa al-Nu‘man ibn Thabit [80 AH/699 A.D. – 150 AH/767 A.D.] is credited by some as being among the first to put forth some of the working methods for engaging Sacred Law in order to try to understand the nature of one’s relationship to Sacred Law [a process which is now referred to – and, in fact, has been referred to in such terms for some time -- as a madhhab or school of jurisprudence]. Interestingly enough, there are a number of incidents which transpired during the lifetime of Abu Hanifa which give rise to some important questions concerning how one might approach the issue of understanding and applying that understanding to matters governed by Sacred Law.
More specifically, at one point in his life, Abu Hanifa had decided to turn down an offer to serve as chief judge – an offer which had been extended to him by Marwan ibn Muhammad, an Umawi caliph. As a result of this rejection, Abu Hanifa received a public punishment consisting of 110 lashes.
The reason which Abu Hanifa gave with respect to his refusal to serve as chief judge is relatively simple and straightforward. He did not want to be in a position where he would be required to pass legal judgment on other individuals.
When the ‘Abbasis overthrew the opposing Umawi caliphate in 132 AH, a new caliph – Abu Jafar al-Mansur [died in AH 158] – came to power. The new caliph wanted Abu Hanifa to be in charge of judicial proceedings in Baghdad.
Once again, Abu Hanifa declined an invitation that was being extended to him which would have required him to assume responsibility with respect to making judgments concerning others in relation to legal issues. Once again, he was punished – this time with imprisonment – and he remained in prison until he passed away in 150 AH.
Abu Hanifa believed in the importance of seeking to arrive at determinations concerning what the nature of Sacred Law may have been in a given set of circumstances. However, he apparently did not believe in the appropriateness of using such determinations to pass legal judgments on others.
Consequently, very early on in Muslim history we encounter a situation in which someone who is cited as being, in a sense, the founder of a school of jurisprudence did not believe that determinations involving the Sacred Law were necessarily a matter of jurisprudence. Instead, the individuals who were seeking to use Sacred Law as a system of jurisprudence were certain leaders who were attempting to impose a particular kind of authority and control over other human beings and using the Sacred Law as justification for what they were attempting to do in those respects.
One of the methods which Abu Hanifa emphasized in his approach to engaging issues of Sacred Law involved shura or consultation with others. Oftentimes, he would present a problem, case, or question concerning Sacred Law and, then, encourage his students to discuss the matter with one another while they analyzed and reflected on the challenge before them. Over a period of time – and this might last for a number of weeks – the group finally would reach a decision concerning the issue in question, and this would be a reflection of all that had gone into the process of consultation.
However, Abu Hanifa once counseled his students by saying: “Anyone who utters a fatwa based on my sayings is only permitted to do so if that individual knows what I used as proof [dalil].” The fatwa being referred to here was not a legal obligation incumbent on all who heard it, but, rather it was a pronouncement about a spiritual determination which had been reached concerning what Abu Hanifa believed was the nature of Sacred Law in a given set of circumstances.
For Abu Hanifa, truly knowing the roots of the proof of something is not at all the same thing as being able to read an account concerning that same something. Proof is in the experiential heart-knowledge and understanding of the hukm -- or the authoritative and governing spiritual principle(s) -- of whatever aspect of Sacred Law that was being explored.
Unless someone understood a given matter in the same way as Abu Hanifa did, then that individual would not understand the nature of the proof upon which Abu Hanifa rested his determination. If one lacked such an understanding, then Abu Hanifa did not want an individual to blindly make a fatwa or pronouncement concerning something which the individual did not properly understand and, then, merely use the name of Abu Hanifa as justification for what was being said.
To the extent that a true ‘proof’ existed concerning the matter at hand, the authority was not Abu Hanifa. Rather, the authority was in the extent to which a given ‘proof’ reflected a truth concerning the nature of Sacred Law in a given set of circumstances.
The fact that Abu Hanifa offered a proof in a given case does not necessarily mean that the issue for which a proof was being provided was correctly or fully understood by him, any more than it necessarily follows that because a ‘proof’ is offered by any given individual, then, therefore, such a ‘proof’ must be correct. Be this as it may, at this point I am far less concerned with whether Abu Hanifa was right or wrong with respect to the ‘proofs’ offered in this or that instance than I am concerned with some of the methodological considerations which appear to have shaped certain features of his perspective.
The features which seem to stand out for me in this respect are two in number. The first methodological principle involves the manner in which Abu Hanifa seemed to be disinclined to use the process of seeking spiritual determinations concerning Sacred Law as a basis for passing judgment on others in any sense which carried legal ramifications. A second methodological principle revolves around the importance of acquiring an understanding of, and insight into, the precise nature of a ‘proof’ which is being offered in conjunction with some given spiritual determination concerning the Sacred Law – blind adherence to such a determination or citing someone’s name as the authority for such a determination is not enough.
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Malik ibn Anas, a second name with which a major school of jurisprudence or madhhab is associated, was believed to have been born somewhere between 90 AH and 97 AH. He died in 179 AH [796 AD].
Apparently, Malik ibn Anas did not leave any explanation concerning the specific methodology which he used for making a determination or judgment concerning the Sacred Law in any particular case. His students indicated that he used a variety of tools through which he sought to assess a given problem, issue, or question concerning what he believed to be the operative aspect of Sacred law in any particular case. These tools included: the Qur’an, the sunna of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), the practices [or amal] of the people of Medina, a form of analogical reasoning, as well as considerations of public interest [that is, maslaha] and various kinds of custom.
Of course, all of the major madhhabs considered the Qur’an, along with the sunna of the Prophet, to constitute two essential sources to be utilized in seeking determinations concerning the way Sacred Law might be related to a given set of circumstances. However, citing these two sources as having central importance to any process of spiritual deliberation is one thing and demonstrating that the manner in which one understands and applies those sources is another matter altogether.
Malik was not only very much aware of the foregoing difference, but he also realized that there could be more than one way of utilizing the Qur’an and the sunna to arrive at a spiritual determination in any given instance. For this reason, Malik sought to indicate to the ‘Abbasi Caliphs that his approach to attempting to understand the nature of the Sacred Law in any particular case should not be the only methodology considered when trying to solve a problem or resolve a conflict.
Once again – as was also the case in relation to the previous discussion involving Abu Hanifa -- I am not as much interested in the specific determinations which Malik may have reached in any particular case as I am interested in a certain dimension of his general approach to the process of trying to understand the nature of the Sacred Law. To this end, one of the most important themes which I see being given expression through his approach to such matters is his willingness to acknowledge that there could be more than one way to pursue Sacred Law, and, as such, there should be no one “official” position concerning how to go about trying to understand the nature of Sacred Law.
Malik was not attempting to establish a systematic and definitive legal code with respect to the nature of Sacred Law. Rather, he was trying to provide food for thought which might be reflected upon by others in relation to various problems, questions, and issues.
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Ahmad ibn Hanbal, a third name with which a major school of jurisprudence is associated, lived from 164 AH to 241 AH -- that is, 780 A.D. to 855 A.D.. Like Malik before him, ibn Hanbal also sought to dissuade others from attempting to systematize the latter’s modes of thinking about various matters concerning the nature of Sacred Law.
He was opposed to the idea of codifying shari‘ah. In fact, ibn Hanbal’s teachings often can be understood as a reaction against the tendencies to codify matters of shari‘ah that had been emerging not only during his lifetime but in earlier times, as well.
For instance, Ibn Hanbal was strenuously opposed to the practice of taqlid – that is, blind obedience – which was beginning to become commonplace during his lifetime. Consequently, as one means of countering this tendency toward blind obedience, he instructed his students that none of his deliberations and determinations concerning any particular case should be written down.
For ibn Hanbal, the Qur’an and the sunna were the preeminent authorities in all efforts of spiritual deliberations. In fact, he was inclined to give preference to a weak Hadith rather than use some form of analogical reasoning in order to reach a spiritual determination concerning the Sacred Law in a given set of circumstances.
On the other hand, sometimes ibn Hanbal would encounter issues in which neither the Qur’an nor the sunna seemed to provide a solution in conjunction with a problem or question that was being considered. On such occasions, ibn Hanbal might use analogical reasoning as a tool of last resort.
Showing posts with label Hanbal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hanbal. Show all posts
Monday, August 18, 2008
Shari'ah: A Muslim's Declaration of Independence - Part 3
The Issue of Ijma
Ibn Hanbal also was often very deferential to the various pronouncements of the results of a given spiritual deliberation concerning the nature of the Sacred Law which were given by some of the Companions of the Prophet – often referred to as a fatwa. However, he attached an important caveat to using such pronouncements as aides to arriving at a spiritual determination in a given issue or problem, and this proviso stipulated that the Companions had to have been unanimous in their agreement with such a pronouncement in order for it be accepted as a possible resource to use in seeking spiritual determinations concerning the nature of Sacred Law.
This foregoing idea of ijma, or consensus, is more complicated than it appears. First and foremost, one faces the question of: Who is going to be counted as a Companion of the Prophet?
For example, is mere acquaintanceship sufficient to qualify someone as a Companion? There were likely to have been many individuals – especially during the later Medina period -- who may have seen and heard the Prophet but who might not thereby necessarily have satisfied the conditions – whatever these may be -- of what it means to be a Companion of the Prophet.
Furthermore, and irrespective of how one decides to identify who is a Companion of the Prophet, one also must deal with the methodological problem of determining whether, or not, all Companions were actually in agreement with some given fatwa issued by one of the other Companions.
If someone does not speak in relation to some given spiritual determination, does such silence necessarily imply consent? Maybe someone who may disagree with such a pronouncement remains silent for personal reasons or out of a wish not to generate dissension or further problems.
Moreover, can one be sure that all Companions knew about such a pronouncement or that they had been asked to give their opinion in relation to that pronouncement? Can one be sure that all of the Companions continued to be in agreement concerning such a pronouncement throughout their lives?
Aside from the foregoing considerations involving the issue of consensus, there is another aspect of ibn Hanbal’s approach to seeking to understand the nature of Sacred Law. For him, the issue of ijma or consensus only had relevance and importance in relation to those individuals who lived in the time of the Prophet. Consequently, a consensus of opinion among religious scholars who lived at some point after the time of the Prophet did not necessarily carry much weight as far as ibn Hanbal was concerned.
One of the major reasons why questions like the foregoing are important to raise is because they should induce one to pause and reflect on just what relevance the idea of ijma or consensus has with respect to the issue of determining how one might approach Sacred Law and shari‘ah. For example, if there were consensus concerning some matter of Sacred Law, then, possibly, such a state of affairs might carry considerable spiritual authority in shaping how one proceeds with respect to engaging the nature of Sacred Law.
Many people refer to a hadith which is attributed to the Prophet in which he is reported to have said that “my community will never agree in error.” Consequently, if some facet of shari‘ah is unanimously agreed upon, then, one might conclude, on the basis of what has been attributed to the Prophet, that whatever has been agreed upon must be free of error and, therefore, true.
Unfortunately, there are those who define ijma, or consensus, in terms of the religious or theological teachings of certain groups, religious scholars, mullahs, and so on who came after the lifetimes of the Companions of the Prophet. In other words, according to this kind of an understanding, if some post-Companion group decides unanimously that such and such is an important facet of, say, shari‘ah, then, those who advocate such a perspective claim that this sort of consensus has a binding authority upon other members of the Muslim community.
Furthermore, individuals who think in this manner often cite the aforementioned Hadith which has been attributed to the Prophet – namely, ‘my community will never agree in error.’ The primary problem with this approach to things is that assumptions are being made concerning what the Prophet meant when he is reported to have said the foregoing statement.
Was the statement of the Prophet concerning his community only intended to refer to decisions made by his Companions? If so, the fact of the matter is that available historical records indicate there were very, very few instances in which the Companions were all asked a question concerning some facet of the shari‘ah and with respect to which they all answered in, more or less, the same way, and, as well, none of the Companions responded by silence with respect to such questions or changed their position concerning such a question.
Did the statement of the Prophet about his community never agreeing in error refer only to certain religious groups or scholars or legal experts who would arise in subsequent times? If so, what is the basis for such a claim, and why would the Companions be excluded from consideration in such matters? Moreover, if the Companions are not to be excluded, then, surely, one is brought back to the default position in which, relatively speaking, there were very few issues which could be shown to have enjoyed unanimous agreement on the part of the Companions, let alone on the part of the Companions as well as whatever subsequent group one wished to cite.
If a group of religious scholars, theologians, or jurists reaches a consensus – that is, a unanimous agreement – on some issue concerning the nature of the Sacred Law, this, in and of itself, says nothing at all about the correctness of what is being agreed upon by that group. The value of such consensus becomes even more suspect if there are other groups of religious scholars, theologians, or jurists who do not share such a perspective on the matter in question.
On the other hand, there may be those who might wish to argue that ijma, or consensus, doesn’t necessarily mean unanimity of agreement. For those individuals who might want to argue in this fashion, they are going to have to come up with an authoritative argument from the Qur’an which indicates that such is the case, and these sorts of individual are also going to have to plausibly justify and explain just what the Prophet meant when he said that his community would never agree in error if ijma does not mean unanimity of agreement on any given point being addressed.
Certainly, there is nothing wrong with considering various positions on a given issue and trying to determine which, if any, of the positions being engaged may be giving expression to the truth. However, the fact that some group has reached consensus on something carries no prima facie binding authority over one unless what is being said can be shown or proven to be stating the truth of a matter, and this means that it is not consensus, per se, which is the source of such binding authority, but rather, it is the truth which carries binding authority upon one – although even here, one has a choice to accept or reject such truth.
Finally, although one can certainly take into account the conduct of the Companions as a possible guide in relation to how one might proceed with respect to understanding and engaging the issue of Sacred Law, there is nothing in any of the foregoing considerations which requires one to follow their example. More specifically, the Companions of the Prophet pursued their particular modes of seeking the truth concerning the nature of Sacred Law according to their individual experiences, historical circumstances, life histories, cultural influences, capacities, needs, and so on. The understandings which arise out of all of this may, or may not, be relevant to the task of struggling toward finding a viable mode of understanding the nature of Sacred Law for life in today’s historical circumstances according to the varying needs of different peoples in different historical and cultural circumstances with varying spiritual capacities – there are many, many factors to consider when engaging such matters.
Consider the following verse:
“And whoever acts hostilely to the Apostle after that guidance has become manifest to him and follows other than the way of the believers, We will turn him to that to which he has [himself] turned.” [Qur’an, 4:115]
The foregoing ayat is given by some as support for the idea of ijma -- that is, there is an equivalence being established between the idea of ijma and the Quranic phrase: “the way of the believers”. However, the way which is being alluded to refers to Divine guidance concerning the path to truth, and this becomes ‘the way of believers’ only when those believers follow the indicated path.
As such, this is not a matter of God giving authority for believers to define what that way is and, then, permitting them to proceed to impose that path, so defined, on others. Secondly, the ayat makes clear that the warning being given only becomes operative after proper understanding has come to someone [that is, become manifest] concerning the truth of the guidance, and, then, such an individual proceeds to not only pursue some other path but to do so in a manner which is hostile to the Prophet. Only at such a juncture will God close the path to truth and allow the individual to stray in error along the path which he or she has chosen.
Although there are various exceptions to what is about to be said, for the most part, ijma or consensus is irrelevant to matters of shari‘ah because the latter is an individual pursuit not a collective activity. To be sure, the pursuit of shari‘ah carries ramifications for the collective, because through such a journey or struggle, the individual, God willing, may acquire qualities of character, understanding, knowledge, wisdom, faith, and adab that can be shared with others and which, God willing, have a constructive, beneficial impact upon society. However, the actual spiritual journey does not require the consensus of others in order for one to be able to proceed even though such consensus, if and when it does occur, can help inform the spiritual journey of the individual, and, moreover, such an individual would be well-advised to carefully consider what has been established through such consensus.
Notwithstanding the foregoing considerations and given that in the time of the Prophet, or shortly thereafter, there were very, very few issues on which consensus had been reached, it is unlikely that consensus will ever be meaningfully established in any way which extends beyond the consensus reached by people during the times of the Prophet. To be sure, there is consensus about the importance of the five pillars, but there are both agreements on, as well as differences concerning, how, specifically, to go about implementing these pillars and the nature of any degrees of freedom one may have in relation to such implementation.]. There is consensus about the importance of the Qur’an, even while, once again, there is no consensus with respect to what the Qur’an necessarily means – although there may be agreement on this or that ayat/verse. There is consensus about the importance of loving the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and having love and respect for the other members of the Prophetic tradition, but there is no consensus on how one should give expression to this love. There is consensus on the importance of the basic principles of faith or iman, but there are differences of understanding with respect to how such faith is to be incorporated into one’s life. There is consensus that everything one does should be done for the sake of Allah, but there are differences about how all of this might fit in with a person’s understanding concerning the nature, purpose, and potential of life. There is consensus that one must strive and struggle with life … that one must make efforts and that one has been given the capacity to choose between good and evil, but there are differences of opinion about what constitutes the good and what constitutes the evil or how to make the best use of the freedom one has been given.
Beyond the foregoing sorts of consensus, one is likely to find very little consensus in relation to matters either public or private. So, rather than canvassing 1.3 billion Muslims, or canvassing this or that group which seeks to arrogate to itself – rather arbitrarily -- the title of “consensus authorities” and allocate to themselves the sole right to establish, or not establish, spiritual consensus -- one might be better off to realize that shari‘ah really is an individual journey during which one may consider this or that perspective of others but with respect to which one will, by and large, find no consensus, and, therefore, as indicated earlier, the notion of ijma is relatively unhelpful when it comes to pursuing and struggling with shari‘ah.
“No soul benefits except from its own works, and none bears the burden of another. Ultimately, you return to your Lord, then He informs you regarding all your disputes." [Qur’an, 6:164]
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As was the case in relation to both Abu Hanifa and Malik, my primary interest with respect to ibn Hanbal has little to do with whatever spiritual determinations may have been reached by him in conjunction with some particular problem or issue involving the nature of Sacred Law. In fact, as was pointed out previously, ibn Hanbal gave specific instructions that his spiritual determinations and judgments concerning particular cases not be written down in order to deter people from blindly adhering to whatever conclusions might be generated by ibn Hanbal, and in this respect he is advocating a position which is very similar to the one voiced by Abu Hanifa, and noted earlier, concerning the importance of properly understanding an issue rather than seeking to blindly apply a determination or judgment with little or no understanding of what one is doing.
Like Abu Hanifa and Malik, ibn Hanbal was not interested in establishing a codification of the Sacred Law. Like Abu Hanifa and Malik, ibn Hanbal was not trying to make claims that his particular approach to understanding the nature of Sacred Law was the only way of making spiritual determinations or judgments. Like Abu Hanifa and Malik, ibn Hanbal had his own unique way of approaching the challenges of life, and he engaged such sources as the Qur’an or the sunna of the Prophet from his own perspective of appropriateness and correctness. Like Abu Hanifa and Malik, ibn Hanbal sought to do what he could to constrain the tendency of people to try to generalize a given spiritual determination arrived at in conjunction with a particular set of circumstances to cases which were beyond the specific situation being considered.
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The birth of Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi‘i is said to have occurred in 150 AH on the very same day that Abu Hanifa passed away. al-Shafi‘i died in 204 AH.
During his various travels and studies, al-Shafi‘i spent time with Malik in Medina. He also is said to have spent time and studied with an individual who had been a close student of Abu Hanifa.
al-Shafi‘i rooted his perspective in the Qur’an and especially the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). al-Shafi‘i believed that what the Prophet said constituted a law which was incumbent upon the community. He felt that the Prophet’s sayings did nothing more than to explain, complement, or particularize the teachings of the Qur’an.
However, in the Qur’an, God says: “And if all the trees in the earth were pens, and the sea, with seven more seas to help it, were ink, the words of Allah could not be exhausted.” [31:27]. Therefore, since the Word of God is infinite in nature, that Word cannot be exhaustively explained nor exhaustively particularized – not even by the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him).
Saying the foregoing does not in any way diminish or denigrate the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), but, rather, it is a way of trying to allude, however inadequately, to the greatness and plenitude of the Divine mystery. In fact, this is a perspective which the Prophet would have been the very first to acknowledge as having priority over everything else.
In addition, this issue of the possible relationship of the sayings of the Prophet in relation to the meaning and significance of Quranic teachings points in the direction of a further matter of considerable importance. More specifically, in a tradition or Hadith narrated by Abu Huraira (may Allah be pleased with him), the messenger of God was informed that some people were writing down his sayings. The Prophet took to the pulpit of the mosque and said, "What are these books that I heard you wrote? I am just a human being. Anyone who has any of these writings should bring it here.” Abu Huraira said we collected all these writings and burned them.
Ibn Saeed Al-Khudry (may Allah be pleased with him) reported that Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) said:
"Do not write anything from me except Qur’an. Anyone who wrote anything other than the Quran shall erase it."
Abu Bakr Siddiq (may Allah be pleased with) had a collection of some 500 hadiths of the Prophet. However, upon hearing about the dire consequences which might befall anyone who perpetrated untruths concerning what the Prophet said, this close Companion of the Prophet -- after he had spent an entire night struggling over the issue of whether, or not, to retain his set of traditions -- burned his collection of Prophetic sayings.
In another tradition, some thirty years after the Prophet had passed away, Zayd Ibn Thabit, another close companion of the Prophet, visited the Khalifa Mu'aawiyah and related a story about the Prophet which Mu'aawiyah liked. Mu’aawiyah ordered someone to write the story down. But Zayd said: "The messenger of God ordered us never to write down anything of his hadith."
The Qur’an does say:
“He who obeys the Messenger obeys God, and whoever turns back, We have not sent you as a keeper over them.” [4:80]
And again:
“Whatsoever the Messenger ordains, you should accept, and whatsoever he forbids, you should abstain from.” [Qur’an, 59:7]
Thus, if the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) gives a specific directive to someone, then, according to the foregoing two verses of the Qur’an, complying with what the Prophet indicates in such a matter is something that is sanctioned and encouraged by God. However, when one attempts to move from, on the one hand: instances in which the Prophet directed people to whom he was speaking or to people in his immediate physical community to do something, to, on the other hand: concluding that, therefore, such directives are intended for all people and all times and all circumstances, then, one is making a very sizable assumption – an assumption which needs to be demonstrated as viable or which can be proven to be correct.
The clearest evidence which stands in opposition to the viability of making an assumption along the foregoing lines with respect to questions concerning the identity of those to whom the Prophet, on any given occasion, is giving specific directives or which stands in opposition to jumping to conclusions with respect to identifying those who are being addressed by the Prophet is given expression through the Prophet’s act of prohibiting the writing down of his sayings. If the Prophet had wanted his specific directives to carry over to the circumstances, times, and conditions which would arise after he passed away, then, he would have indicated that what he said should be written down and passed on – yet, such an indication is just the opposite of what he actually instructed the people in his physical community to do.
Furthermore, however one wishes to understand such matters, nonetheless, as the remainder of Surah 4, Ayat 80 cited previously indicates, neither the Prophet nor the believers have been given the responsibility of assuming the role of keepers over those who turn back from following the Prophet. Even if one were to accept the idea that what the Prophet said more than 1400 years ago still applies to Muslims living in today’s world, the Qur’an is also giving an indication that God has not authorized anyone to be a keeper over people with respect to such issues.
When the imperative mood is used in grammar, many people wish to interpret this to mean that whatever is being said in this manner constitutes an obligation, command, ordinance, duty, order, or law. Generally speaking, however, the imperative mood is meant to give expression to an intention which is designed to influence a listener’s behavior or understanding.
To say that something is a command, ordinance, duty, order, or law certainly all constitute ways intended to influence another person’s behavior or understanding. Nevertheless, to urge someone to do something, without commanding or ordering that person to perform such an action, or to try to persuade someone, or to indicate to someone, or impress on someone concerning the importance of some given activity – all of this still gives expression to the imperative mood because one’s intention is to influence the behavior of the individual being addressed, but doing things in this way is not necessarily in the form of a command, order, ordinance, or law.
If there is a cliff toward which someone is unknowingly running, and I seek to influence the behavior of that individual to stop running in the problematic direction, I am not necessarily ordering or commanding or ordaining that the individual should stop running. Furthermore, I am not necessarily saying that there is a law which stipulates that one must stop running when approaching a cliff, nor am I necessarily saying that the person has a duty to stop running.
What I am trying to do is somehow impress on the individual that difficulties may lay in store for that person if she or he continues to run in the same direction and, thereby, fails to give proper cognizance to the warnings being given. What I am trying to do is impress upon the individual in question that there is a potential benefit associated with listening to what is being said.
God has said: “There is no compulsion in Deen.” [Qur’an, 2:256] To place someone else under an obligation, duty, ordinance, or legal injunction are all forms of compulsion.
On the other hand, if one chooses to heed the counsel, advice, or warning which is given, then, one is acting in accordance with the information which has been communicated, but one is not necessarily acting in this manner in order to fulfill a perceived duty or obligation or because what is being communicated is a legal injunction of some kind which is incumbent on one to obey. One has chosen to comply with some warning, advice, counsel, or guidance because one has been persuaded – for whatever reason -- by what has been said to the point where one is willing to permit one’s behavior to be influenced in a certain way.
When one sees the truth of something, one is not obligated to act in accordance with such truth. At the same time, when one comes to understand the truth of something, one is not necessarily inclined to act contrary to the manner in which such a truth informs one’s understanding and manner of engaging certain facets of life.
There is a difference between, on the one hand, stating that something is an ordinance which is incumbent on the individual who is listening to what is being stipulated and, on the other hand, stating that performing certain actions would be in a person’s best interests. The former invites one to do little more than obey without necessarily having any understanding as to why she or he is doing something, whereas the latter approach to things invites a person to explore the relationship between what one is being advised to do and the issue of trying to determine what might constitute one’s best interests.
If one comes to understand the operative principle involved in what might happen to someone if he or she runs off a cliff, then, such understanding tends to shape one’s way of engaging certain aspects of existence. However, once this sort of understanding takes root, one does not necessarily feel under some duty or obligation to keep such understanding in mind, nor does one necessarily consider such understanding an ordinance or command or legal injunction of some kind even as one does understand that acting in accordance with such an understanding may be in one’s best interests.
Divine guidance is not necessarily about duties, ordinances, legal injunctions, commands, or obligations. True guidance is about assisting an individual to come to an understanding of the way things are and to help such a person to learn how to act in accordance with such an understanding.
One is free to accept such guidance or reject it. However, one rejects the guidance at one’s own risk because the guidance is seeking to communicate to one something of essential importance about the nature of how things are with respect one’s potential and the relationship of that potential with respect to the rest of existence.
Aside from the fact that the Qur’an indicates that there can be no compulsion in matters of Deen, the Qur’an also indicates that “tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter”. [2:191]. To seek to impose Sacred Law onto people is to oppress them even if one’s intention is a matter of seeking to do that which one believes will be of assistance to them. Sacred Law is something which must be realized, not something which can be imposed.
Whatever one does in the way of assistance with respect to other individuals, this cannot involve oppression. One can talk with people. One can debate in good ways with them. One can seek to persuade others provided that one does not exceed due limits. One can engage in research and discussion in the hopes that people may see the value of what one is saying … but one cannot oppress them.
Moreover, God has not given authority to anyone to oppress other human beings. Rather, the guidance is precisely the opposite – to struggle against oppression and to help terminate the latter.
Or, if one engages the issue of the Sacred Law from the perspective of justice and equitability, then, one is not doing justice to others if one takes away their freedom to choose between good and evil. Life is meant to be a struggle, and it is a struggle in which not everyone may succeed so far as spiritual issues are concerned.
One of the rights which others have over us is the right to be free from being oppressed by us. When shari‘ah – which is, in actuality, the spiritual journey toward seeking to understand the nature of Sacred Law -- is imposed on others, then one is violating such a right, just as much as someone who rejects shari‘ah is violating the rights of others when the former seeks to impose his or her way of doing things on those who wish to pursue shari‘ah.
People have the right and they should have the freedom to choose between good and evil. People do not have the right and they should not have the freedom to impose such choices on others.
The basic right to choose between good and evil is integral to the path of shari‘ah. The issue of providing the sort of environment in which people are free from any sort of oppression, exploitation, or abuse which would interfere with, or undermine, such a basic right is the province of governance – that is, the regulation of the public space or commons so that the freedom to pursue shari‘ah is protected.
Whatever force is used – and one cannot transgress due limits here with respect to the use of force – such compulsory measures can only be used to ensure that no one is oppressed with respect to the right to choose as they please as long as their choices do not spill over into the lives of others and, thereby, introduce oppression into the community. Indeed, one of the primary tasks of any government is to protect the public space so that it is free from oppression of any kind. The task of government is not to ensure that people follow a particular understanding of Sacred Law or to compel them to pursue a particular spiritual journey [i.e., shari‘ah] toward understanding the nature of Sacred Law.
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Ibn Hanbal also was often very deferential to the various pronouncements of the results of a given spiritual deliberation concerning the nature of the Sacred Law which were given by some of the Companions of the Prophet – often referred to as a fatwa. However, he attached an important caveat to using such pronouncements as aides to arriving at a spiritual determination in a given issue or problem, and this proviso stipulated that the Companions had to have been unanimous in their agreement with such a pronouncement in order for it be accepted as a possible resource to use in seeking spiritual determinations concerning the nature of Sacred Law.
This foregoing idea of ijma, or consensus, is more complicated than it appears. First and foremost, one faces the question of: Who is going to be counted as a Companion of the Prophet?
For example, is mere acquaintanceship sufficient to qualify someone as a Companion? There were likely to have been many individuals – especially during the later Medina period -- who may have seen and heard the Prophet but who might not thereby necessarily have satisfied the conditions – whatever these may be -- of what it means to be a Companion of the Prophet.
Furthermore, and irrespective of how one decides to identify who is a Companion of the Prophet, one also must deal with the methodological problem of determining whether, or not, all Companions were actually in agreement with some given fatwa issued by one of the other Companions.
If someone does not speak in relation to some given spiritual determination, does such silence necessarily imply consent? Maybe someone who may disagree with such a pronouncement remains silent for personal reasons or out of a wish not to generate dissension or further problems.
Moreover, can one be sure that all Companions knew about such a pronouncement or that they had been asked to give their opinion in relation to that pronouncement? Can one be sure that all of the Companions continued to be in agreement concerning such a pronouncement throughout their lives?
Aside from the foregoing considerations involving the issue of consensus, there is another aspect of ibn Hanbal’s approach to seeking to understand the nature of Sacred Law. For him, the issue of ijma or consensus only had relevance and importance in relation to those individuals who lived in the time of the Prophet. Consequently, a consensus of opinion among religious scholars who lived at some point after the time of the Prophet did not necessarily carry much weight as far as ibn Hanbal was concerned.
One of the major reasons why questions like the foregoing are important to raise is because they should induce one to pause and reflect on just what relevance the idea of ijma or consensus has with respect to the issue of determining how one might approach Sacred Law and shari‘ah. For example, if there were consensus concerning some matter of Sacred Law, then, possibly, such a state of affairs might carry considerable spiritual authority in shaping how one proceeds with respect to engaging the nature of Sacred Law.
Many people refer to a hadith which is attributed to the Prophet in which he is reported to have said that “my community will never agree in error.” Consequently, if some facet of shari‘ah is unanimously agreed upon, then, one might conclude, on the basis of what has been attributed to the Prophet, that whatever has been agreed upon must be free of error and, therefore, true.
Unfortunately, there are those who define ijma, or consensus, in terms of the religious or theological teachings of certain groups, religious scholars, mullahs, and so on who came after the lifetimes of the Companions of the Prophet. In other words, according to this kind of an understanding, if some post-Companion group decides unanimously that such and such is an important facet of, say, shari‘ah, then, those who advocate such a perspective claim that this sort of consensus has a binding authority upon other members of the Muslim community.
Furthermore, individuals who think in this manner often cite the aforementioned Hadith which has been attributed to the Prophet – namely, ‘my community will never agree in error.’ The primary problem with this approach to things is that assumptions are being made concerning what the Prophet meant when he is reported to have said the foregoing statement.
Was the statement of the Prophet concerning his community only intended to refer to decisions made by his Companions? If so, the fact of the matter is that available historical records indicate there were very, very few instances in which the Companions were all asked a question concerning some facet of the shari‘ah and with respect to which they all answered in, more or less, the same way, and, as well, none of the Companions responded by silence with respect to such questions or changed their position concerning such a question.
Did the statement of the Prophet about his community never agreeing in error refer only to certain religious groups or scholars or legal experts who would arise in subsequent times? If so, what is the basis for such a claim, and why would the Companions be excluded from consideration in such matters? Moreover, if the Companions are not to be excluded, then, surely, one is brought back to the default position in which, relatively speaking, there were very few issues which could be shown to have enjoyed unanimous agreement on the part of the Companions, let alone on the part of the Companions as well as whatever subsequent group one wished to cite.
If a group of religious scholars, theologians, or jurists reaches a consensus – that is, a unanimous agreement – on some issue concerning the nature of the Sacred Law, this, in and of itself, says nothing at all about the correctness of what is being agreed upon by that group. The value of such consensus becomes even more suspect if there are other groups of religious scholars, theologians, or jurists who do not share such a perspective on the matter in question.
On the other hand, there may be those who might wish to argue that ijma, or consensus, doesn’t necessarily mean unanimity of agreement. For those individuals who might want to argue in this fashion, they are going to have to come up with an authoritative argument from the Qur’an which indicates that such is the case, and these sorts of individual are also going to have to plausibly justify and explain just what the Prophet meant when he said that his community would never agree in error if ijma does not mean unanimity of agreement on any given point being addressed.
Certainly, there is nothing wrong with considering various positions on a given issue and trying to determine which, if any, of the positions being engaged may be giving expression to the truth. However, the fact that some group has reached consensus on something carries no prima facie binding authority over one unless what is being said can be shown or proven to be stating the truth of a matter, and this means that it is not consensus, per se, which is the source of such binding authority, but rather, it is the truth which carries binding authority upon one – although even here, one has a choice to accept or reject such truth.
Finally, although one can certainly take into account the conduct of the Companions as a possible guide in relation to how one might proceed with respect to understanding and engaging the issue of Sacred Law, there is nothing in any of the foregoing considerations which requires one to follow their example. More specifically, the Companions of the Prophet pursued their particular modes of seeking the truth concerning the nature of Sacred Law according to their individual experiences, historical circumstances, life histories, cultural influences, capacities, needs, and so on. The understandings which arise out of all of this may, or may not, be relevant to the task of struggling toward finding a viable mode of understanding the nature of Sacred Law for life in today’s historical circumstances according to the varying needs of different peoples in different historical and cultural circumstances with varying spiritual capacities – there are many, many factors to consider when engaging such matters.
Consider the following verse:
“And whoever acts hostilely to the Apostle after that guidance has become manifest to him and follows other than the way of the believers, We will turn him to that to which he has [himself] turned.” [Qur’an, 4:115]
The foregoing ayat is given by some as support for the idea of ijma -- that is, there is an equivalence being established between the idea of ijma and the Quranic phrase: “the way of the believers”. However, the way which is being alluded to refers to Divine guidance concerning the path to truth, and this becomes ‘the way of believers’ only when those believers follow the indicated path.
As such, this is not a matter of God giving authority for believers to define what that way is and, then, permitting them to proceed to impose that path, so defined, on others. Secondly, the ayat makes clear that the warning being given only becomes operative after proper understanding has come to someone [that is, become manifest] concerning the truth of the guidance, and, then, such an individual proceeds to not only pursue some other path but to do so in a manner which is hostile to the Prophet. Only at such a juncture will God close the path to truth and allow the individual to stray in error along the path which he or she has chosen.
Although there are various exceptions to what is about to be said, for the most part, ijma or consensus is irrelevant to matters of shari‘ah because the latter is an individual pursuit not a collective activity. To be sure, the pursuit of shari‘ah carries ramifications for the collective, because through such a journey or struggle, the individual, God willing, may acquire qualities of character, understanding, knowledge, wisdom, faith, and adab that can be shared with others and which, God willing, have a constructive, beneficial impact upon society. However, the actual spiritual journey does not require the consensus of others in order for one to be able to proceed even though such consensus, if and when it does occur, can help inform the spiritual journey of the individual, and, moreover, such an individual would be well-advised to carefully consider what has been established through such consensus.
Notwithstanding the foregoing considerations and given that in the time of the Prophet, or shortly thereafter, there were very, very few issues on which consensus had been reached, it is unlikely that consensus will ever be meaningfully established in any way which extends beyond the consensus reached by people during the times of the Prophet. To be sure, there is consensus about the importance of the five pillars, but there are both agreements on, as well as differences concerning, how, specifically, to go about implementing these pillars and the nature of any degrees of freedom one may have in relation to such implementation.]. There is consensus about the importance of the Qur’an, even while, once again, there is no consensus with respect to what the Qur’an necessarily means – although there may be agreement on this or that ayat/verse. There is consensus about the importance of loving the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and having love and respect for the other members of the Prophetic tradition, but there is no consensus on how one should give expression to this love. There is consensus on the importance of the basic principles of faith or iman, but there are differences of understanding with respect to how such faith is to be incorporated into one’s life. There is consensus that everything one does should be done for the sake of Allah, but there are differences about how all of this might fit in with a person’s understanding concerning the nature, purpose, and potential of life. There is consensus that one must strive and struggle with life … that one must make efforts and that one has been given the capacity to choose between good and evil, but there are differences of opinion about what constitutes the good and what constitutes the evil or how to make the best use of the freedom one has been given.
Beyond the foregoing sorts of consensus, one is likely to find very little consensus in relation to matters either public or private. So, rather than canvassing 1.3 billion Muslims, or canvassing this or that group which seeks to arrogate to itself – rather arbitrarily -- the title of “consensus authorities” and allocate to themselves the sole right to establish, or not establish, spiritual consensus -- one might be better off to realize that shari‘ah really is an individual journey during which one may consider this or that perspective of others but with respect to which one will, by and large, find no consensus, and, therefore, as indicated earlier, the notion of ijma is relatively unhelpful when it comes to pursuing and struggling with shari‘ah.
“No soul benefits except from its own works, and none bears the burden of another. Ultimately, you return to your Lord, then He informs you regarding all your disputes." [Qur’an, 6:164]
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As was the case in relation to both Abu Hanifa and Malik, my primary interest with respect to ibn Hanbal has little to do with whatever spiritual determinations may have been reached by him in conjunction with some particular problem or issue involving the nature of Sacred Law. In fact, as was pointed out previously, ibn Hanbal gave specific instructions that his spiritual determinations and judgments concerning particular cases not be written down in order to deter people from blindly adhering to whatever conclusions might be generated by ibn Hanbal, and in this respect he is advocating a position which is very similar to the one voiced by Abu Hanifa, and noted earlier, concerning the importance of properly understanding an issue rather than seeking to blindly apply a determination or judgment with little or no understanding of what one is doing.
Like Abu Hanifa and Malik, ibn Hanbal was not interested in establishing a codification of the Sacred Law. Like Abu Hanifa and Malik, ibn Hanbal was not trying to make claims that his particular approach to understanding the nature of Sacred Law was the only way of making spiritual determinations or judgments. Like Abu Hanifa and Malik, ibn Hanbal had his own unique way of approaching the challenges of life, and he engaged such sources as the Qur’an or the sunna of the Prophet from his own perspective of appropriateness and correctness. Like Abu Hanifa and Malik, ibn Hanbal sought to do what he could to constrain the tendency of people to try to generalize a given spiritual determination arrived at in conjunction with a particular set of circumstances to cases which were beyond the specific situation being considered.
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The birth of Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi‘i is said to have occurred in 150 AH on the very same day that Abu Hanifa passed away. al-Shafi‘i died in 204 AH.
During his various travels and studies, al-Shafi‘i spent time with Malik in Medina. He also is said to have spent time and studied with an individual who had been a close student of Abu Hanifa.
al-Shafi‘i rooted his perspective in the Qur’an and especially the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). al-Shafi‘i believed that what the Prophet said constituted a law which was incumbent upon the community. He felt that the Prophet’s sayings did nothing more than to explain, complement, or particularize the teachings of the Qur’an.
However, in the Qur’an, God says: “And if all the trees in the earth were pens, and the sea, with seven more seas to help it, were ink, the words of Allah could not be exhausted.” [31:27]. Therefore, since the Word of God is infinite in nature, that Word cannot be exhaustively explained nor exhaustively particularized – not even by the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him).
Saying the foregoing does not in any way diminish or denigrate the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), but, rather, it is a way of trying to allude, however inadequately, to the greatness and plenitude of the Divine mystery. In fact, this is a perspective which the Prophet would have been the very first to acknowledge as having priority over everything else.
In addition, this issue of the possible relationship of the sayings of the Prophet in relation to the meaning and significance of Quranic teachings points in the direction of a further matter of considerable importance. More specifically, in a tradition or Hadith narrated by Abu Huraira (may Allah be pleased with him), the messenger of God was informed that some people were writing down his sayings. The Prophet took to the pulpit of the mosque and said, "What are these books that I heard you wrote? I am just a human being. Anyone who has any of these writings should bring it here.” Abu Huraira said we collected all these writings and burned them.
Ibn Saeed Al-Khudry (may Allah be pleased with him) reported that Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) said:
"Do not write anything from me except Qur’an. Anyone who wrote anything other than the Quran shall erase it."
Abu Bakr Siddiq (may Allah be pleased with) had a collection of some 500 hadiths of the Prophet. However, upon hearing about the dire consequences which might befall anyone who perpetrated untruths concerning what the Prophet said, this close Companion of the Prophet -- after he had spent an entire night struggling over the issue of whether, or not, to retain his set of traditions -- burned his collection of Prophetic sayings.
In another tradition, some thirty years after the Prophet had passed away, Zayd Ibn Thabit, another close companion of the Prophet, visited the Khalifa Mu'aawiyah and related a story about the Prophet which Mu'aawiyah liked. Mu’aawiyah ordered someone to write the story down. But Zayd said: "The messenger of God ordered us never to write down anything of his hadith."
The Qur’an does say:
“He who obeys the Messenger obeys God, and whoever turns back, We have not sent you as a keeper over them.” [4:80]
And again:
“Whatsoever the Messenger ordains, you should accept, and whatsoever he forbids, you should abstain from.” [Qur’an, 59:7]
Thus, if the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) gives a specific directive to someone, then, according to the foregoing two verses of the Qur’an, complying with what the Prophet indicates in such a matter is something that is sanctioned and encouraged by God. However, when one attempts to move from, on the one hand: instances in which the Prophet directed people to whom he was speaking or to people in his immediate physical community to do something, to, on the other hand: concluding that, therefore, such directives are intended for all people and all times and all circumstances, then, one is making a very sizable assumption – an assumption which needs to be demonstrated as viable or which can be proven to be correct.
The clearest evidence which stands in opposition to the viability of making an assumption along the foregoing lines with respect to questions concerning the identity of those to whom the Prophet, on any given occasion, is giving specific directives or which stands in opposition to jumping to conclusions with respect to identifying those who are being addressed by the Prophet is given expression through the Prophet’s act of prohibiting the writing down of his sayings. If the Prophet had wanted his specific directives to carry over to the circumstances, times, and conditions which would arise after he passed away, then, he would have indicated that what he said should be written down and passed on – yet, such an indication is just the opposite of what he actually instructed the people in his physical community to do.
Furthermore, however one wishes to understand such matters, nonetheless, as the remainder of Surah 4, Ayat 80 cited previously indicates, neither the Prophet nor the believers have been given the responsibility of assuming the role of keepers over those who turn back from following the Prophet. Even if one were to accept the idea that what the Prophet said more than 1400 years ago still applies to Muslims living in today’s world, the Qur’an is also giving an indication that God has not authorized anyone to be a keeper over people with respect to such issues.
When the imperative mood is used in grammar, many people wish to interpret this to mean that whatever is being said in this manner constitutes an obligation, command, ordinance, duty, order, or law. Generally speaking, however, the imperative mood is meant to give expression to an intention which is designed to influence a listener’s behavior or understanding.
To say that something is a command, ordinance, duty, order, or law certainly all constitute ways intended to influence another person’s behavior or understanding. Nevertheless, to urge someone to do something, without commanding or ordering that person to perform such an action, or to try to persuade someone, or to indicate to someone, or impress on someone concerning the importance of some given activity – all of this still gives expression to the imperative mood because one’s intention is to influence the behavior of the individual being addressed, but doing things in this way is not necessarily in the form of a command, order, ordinance, or law.
If there is a cliff toward which someone is unknowingly running, and I seek to influence the behavior of that individual to stop running in the problematic direction, I am not necessarily ordering or commanding or ordaining that the individual should stop running. Furthermore, I am not necessarily saying that there is a law which stipulates that one must stop running when approaching a cliff, nor am I necessarily saying that the person has a duty to stop running.
What I am trying to do is somehow impress on the individual that difficulties may lay in store for that person if she or he continues to run in the same direction and, thereby, fails to give proper cognizance to the warnings being given. What I am trying to do is impress upon the individual in question that there is a potential benefit associated with listening to what is being said.
God has said: “There is no compulsion in Deen.” [Qur’an, 2:256] To place someone else under an obligation, duty, ordinance, or legal injunction are all forms of compulsion.
On the other hand, if one chooses to heed the counsel, advice, or warning which is given, then, one is acting in accordance with the information which has been communicated, but one is not necessarily acting in this manner in order to fulfill a perceived duty or obligation or because what is being communicated is a legal injunction of some kind which is incumbent on one to obey. One has chosen to comply with some warning, advice, counsel, or guidance because one has been persuaded – for whatever reason -- by what has been said to the point where one is willing to permit one’s behavior to be influenced in a certain way.
When one sees the truth of something, one is not obligated to act in accordance with such truth. At the same time, when one comes to understand the truth of something, one is not necessarily inclined to act contrary to the manner in which such a truth informs one’s understanding and manner of engaging certain facets of life.
There is a difference between, on the one hand, stating that something is an ordinance which is incumbent on the individual who is listening to what is being stipulated and, on the other hand, stating that performing certain actions would be in a person’s best interests. The former invites one to do little more than obey without necessarily having any understanding as to why she or he is doing something, whereas the latter approach to things invites a person to explore the relationship between what one is being advised to do and the issue of trying to determine what might constitute one’s best interests.
If one comes to understand the operative principle involved in what might happen to someone if he or she runs off a cliff, then, such understanding tends to shape one’s way of engaging certain aspects of existence. However, once this sort of understanding takes root, one does not necessarily feel under some duty or obligation to keep such understanding in mind, nor does one necessarily consider such understanding an ordinance or command or legal injunction of some kind even as one does understand that acting in accordance with such an understanding may be in one’s best interests.
Divine guidance is not necessarily about duties, ordinances, legal injunctions, commands, or obligations. True guidance is about assisting an individual to come to an understanding of the way things are and to help such a person to learn how to act in accordance with such an understanding.
One is free to accept such guidance or reject it. However, one rejects the guidance at one’s own risk because the guidance is seeking to communicate to one something of essential importance about the nature of how things are with respect one’s potential and the relationship of that potential with respect to the rest of existence.
Aside from the fact that the Qur’an indicates that there can be no compulsion in matters of Deen, the Qur’an also indicates that “tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter”. [2:191]. To seek to impose Sacred Law onto people is to oppress them even if one’s intention is a matter of seeking to do that which one believes will be of assistance to them. Sacred Law is something which must be realized, not something which can be imposed.
Whatever one does in the way of assistance with respect to other individuals, this cannot involve oppression. One can talk with people. One can debate in good ways with them. One can seek to persuade others provided that one does not exceed due limits. One can engage in research and discussion in the hopes that people may see the value of what one is saying … but one cannot oppress them.
Moreover, God has not given authority to anyone to oppress other human beings. Rather, the guidance is precisely the opposite – to struggle against oppression and to help terminate the latter.
Or, if one engages the issue of the Sacred Law from the perspective of justice and equitability, then, one is not doing justice to others if one takes away their freedom to choose between good and evil. Life is meant to be a struggle, and it is a struggle in which not everyone may succeed so far as spiritual issues are concerned.
One of the rights which others have over us is the right to be free from being oppressed by us. When shari‘ah – which is, in actuality, the spiritual journey toward seeking to understand the nature of Sacred Law -- is imposed on others, then one is violating such a right, just as much as someone who rejects shari‘ah is violating the rights of others when the former seeks to impose his or her way of doing things on those who wish to pursue shari‘ah.
People have the right and they should have the freedom to choose between good and evil. People do not have the right and they should not have the freedom to impose such choices on others.
The basic right to choose between good and evil is integral to the path of shari‘ah. The issue of providing the sort of environment in which people are free from any sort of oppression, exploitation, or abuse which would interfere with, or undermine, such a basic right is the province of governance – that is, the regulation of the public space or commons so that the freedom to pursue shari‘ah is protected.
Whatever force is used – and one cannot transgress due limits here with respect to the use of force – such compulsory measures can only be used to ensure that no one is oppressed with respect to the right to choose as they please as long as their choices do not spill over into the lives of others and, thereby, introduce oppression into the community. Indeed, one of the primary tasks of any government is to protect the public space so that it is free from oppression of any kind. The task of government is not to ensure that people follow a particular understanding of Sacred Law or to compel them to pursue a particular spiritual journey [i.e., shari‘ah] toward understanding the nature of Sacred Law.
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